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Frank  L Michelnan*
I.  INTRODUCTION:  THE NORMATIVE  QUESTION
Here  is  a premise  that I  expect  not  everyone  will  accept,  or
maybe  even let pass without  a derisory hoot or two:  The onset of
Internet voting calls for normative stock-taking.
A symposium on "Internet Voting" is summoned, I assume, with
the hope  of contributing  to  thought  about  what  best  to  do  about
Internet voting, either addressing  that question here and now or lay-
ing descriptive and other groundwork for others who will take it up
later.  But one can't begin to think about what to do, or about how to
organize information for thinking about what to do-one can't even
work up a raw, gut reaction to the prospect of Internet voting, pro or
con-without  some  prior notion,  however  vague,  about  what  I'm
going to call the Normative  Question:  What is the point of holding
votes?  What is that practice  supposed to be good for, or right  for?
What social goals is it supposed to advance,  or moral mandates  is it
supposed to satisfy?
I think we all carry answers  around in our heads, more  or less
examined.  I do not see how they can help but affect our reactions,
enthused  or revolted  as the case may be, to  the rush of events pre-
sented to us by Dick Morris in his paper  for this Symposium as the
arrival, finally, of Democracy, its hour come round at last via Inter-
net.'  But for these takes  on what voting is  for (maybe it is just a
game,  a  sport?),  how  could  anyone  react  at  all-as  our  authors
*  Robert Walmsley  University  Professor, Harvard  University.  I  wrote
this in October 2000.  I sit here reviewing it on November  17,  in the midst of
an amazing  national  self-examination  touching  on some of its  central  ques-
tions.  I am going to let it stand as written, with the feeling that it stands up, so
far, pretty well.
1. See Dick Morris, Direct  Democracy and the Internet, 34 LoY.  L.A. L
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appear to do-to Internet-related  prospects for diminished  influence
for big bucks  and  special interests,2  or for a shift toward  direct  de-
mocracy,3 or for the dissolution  of historic American  attachment  to
geography-bound,  simple majoritarian  schemes  of legislative  repre-
sentation?4  Our  papers  consider  the possibility  that  letting people
vote by Internet  may have the effect of increasing voting participa-
tion  primarily  among  higher-status  groups  who  already  vote  at
above-average  rates.5  How  are  we supposed  to react  to  that pros-
pect?  How would James Madison have reacted to it?6
Taking the matter a little beyond Madison, we can be sure there
are those among us who feel, in their heart of hearts, that the point of
holding votes is to  enable elites to  rule while letting the masses be-
lieve they are in control.  They may react differently to the unfolding
events,  and prescribe  differently  in regard to them,  from those who
think-however heroically-that the point is truly to honor the right
of the people to rule,7 or truly to allow everyone a share in authorship
of the laws.8  Still different appraisals and prescriptions may occur to
those who think the point of holding votes  is to guide governmental
outcomes toward aggregate social welfare, 9 or, perhaps, is to find out
2.  See id. at 1033-34,  1049-50.
3. See id. at 1051-52.
4.  See Eben Moglen &  Pamela  S.  Karlan, The Soul of a New Political  Ma-
chine: The Online, The Color  Line and  Electronic  Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L.
REV.  1089,  1098 (2001).
5. See  id.; see  also R.  Michael  Alvarez  & Jonathan  Nagler,  The Likely
Consequences of  Internet Voting for Political  Representation, 34 LOY.  L.A.  L.
REv.  1115,  1121  (2001)  ("[A]ny  reform to  increase  turnout can  increase  the
turnout rate among rich people by almost ten percent.").
6.  For a relayed message on this point from a "jmadison@founding.gov,"
see  Dennis  Thompson,  James  Madison  on  Cyberdemocracy,  in
DEMOCRACY.COM?  GOVERNANCE IN A NETWORKED WORLD  (Elaine Kamarck
& Joseph Nye eds. 1999).
7.  See,  e.g.,  RICHARD  D.  PARKER,  HERE,  THE  PEOPLE  RULE:  A
CONSTITUTIONAL  POPULIST MANIFESTO  97  (1994)  (writing of the  "ideal"  or
"claim"  that  "'common'  people,  ordinary  people-not  their  'betters,'  not
somebody  else's  conception  of their supposed  'better  selves'-are  the  ones
who are entitled to govern our country").
8.  See,  e.g.,  JORGEN  HABERMAS,  BETWEEN  FACTS  AND  NORMS:
CONTRIBUTIONS  TO A DISCOURSE THEORY  OF LAW  AND DEMOCRACY  121-22
(William  Rehg trans.,  1996)  (explaining that  citizens  are  autonomous  only if
the addressees of the law can also see themselves  as its authors).
9. See infra text accompanying note 23.
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and institute true answers to  questions of political justice by pooling
the deliberative judgments of everyone.' 0
Maybe this is all too complicated.  It's easy and smart to shrug
off the Normative  Question.  Come off it, we say.  We engage in the
practice  of holding votes  because we have to-because  our demo-
cratic  ideology,  our  constitutions,  and  our other  laws  leave  us  no
other way to  get on with business we need or badly want to get on
with.  These things are true as far as they go, but they seem to  leave
the Normative  Question vastly underdetermined.  Laws  are change-
able  within  constitutional  bounds,  and  constitutional  bounds  are
loose and uncertain.  Not only are laws and bounds amendable,  they
are  interpretable;  and  not  only  are  they  interpretable,  they  are,  to
most practical intents and purposes, amendable by interpretation.  As
written, they leave us with endless,  major choices  about how to  ar-
range the  voting they  doubtless  require.  So  it seems  that  thought
about how to proceed still requires  some further  clarification,  some
further specification, of what is supposed to be so "hot" about voting.
How about prevailing democratic  ideology to  the  rescue?  Can
we find there the clarification  and  specification we need  for intelli-
gent thought about voting arrangements and related uses of the Inter-
net?  A scientist might say our democratic ideology is far too cloudy,
far too  contestable  and  contested,  to determine  our voting arrange-
ments.  I am not completely sure that it is, a point to be developed  as
these remarks  proceed.  I am not completely sure that we can't put
the Normative  Question to bed by noticing the simple facts  that (a)
sometimes  decisions have to get made that are going to bind a lot of
people whichever way they go, and (b) often there does not seem  to
be any close competitor to voting as a sensible or socially acceptable
way to get the job done.  Maybe an intelligent approach  to our ques-
tions requires  no thicker  a normative  theory of voting than  the one
that says  that sometimes  voting is  socially  and  culturally  unavoid-
able.  I'm inclined to doubt that we can get away with that, I want to
doubt it, but I am not sure.
It is in the spirit of testing my doubts that I devote these remarks
to pursuit of the Normative Question:  Why voting?  Now, I am not
fool enough to try for a comprehensive or definitive answer, not here
10.  See infra  note 27 and accompanying text.
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or anywhere.  I am merely going to put on display, in what I hope is
an interesting and helpful  ordering, what I hope is something  like a
full array of the sorts of answers currently found in our political  cul-
ture.  So this will be an array of normative theories of voting-using
"theories"  in a very loose sense, because my array is  an indiscrimi-
nate mix  of crude vernacular truisms  and  shamelessly bowdlerized
political  science  and  political  philosophy-but  I  am  going  to  be
pretty  consistently  non normative  about  it.  I  may here  and  there
draw out an apparent prescriptive  implication of one or another the-
ory in the  array, but I mainly  leave  for other times  and places  my
views and  arguments respecting the moral merits of the theories.  I
admit my distaste for some of them will be apparent.
No  new  discoveries  are  in  store.  One  general  lesson  perhaps
emerges, in tune with other papers we'll be hearing:  When it comes
to  thought  about the  Internet's  possible  or  likely uses  in, or  conse-
quences  for, the politics of a constitutional  democracy,  it may be  a
mistake  to focus too sharply  on voting in the usual, formal  sense of
that term-the "Election Day/legislative"  sense,  as I'll call it.  Vot-
ing,  in this  sense,  signifies  a bringing  together  of the  entire  fran-
chised  populace,  or  the  entire  legislative  membership,  at  an  ap-
pointed time, to cast official ballots on officially certified candidacies
or officially worded propositions,  the official tally of which will be
directly and legally determinative of who shall hold office or of what
the laws shall say.
II.  VOTING AND MAJORITY RULE
In these United States, any canvass of extant normative theories
of Election Day voting must start with normative theories of majority
rule.  Intuitively, after all, to most Americans  almost all of the time,
Election  Day voting simply is the operational  side of majority rule,
the ineluctable putting into practice of the idea of rule by the major-
ity.  But wherein lies the appeal to us, the hold on us, of the idea of
rule by the majority?  In order to  answer adequately,  I think we do
well to notice how our everyday thought may commingle  two  quite
distinct ways of conceiving of rule by the majority, which I shall la-
bel  "substantive"  and  "procedural'"-although  I  am not  sure  that a
better set of terms wouldn't be "essentialist"  and "constructivist."
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A.  Substantive Conceptions ofRule By the Majority
1.  Simple substantive majoritarianism
The difference between a procedural (constructivist)  and a sub-
stantive (essentialist)  conception of rule by the majority starts  with
how we conceive of, and accordingly identify, that fraction or subset
of the entire population to which we give the name of "the majority."
In  a procedural  conception,  membership  in  the majority  is strictly
constructed by the procedure of taking  a vote on  a particular  occa-
sion.  Membership  in a majority, accordingly,  is  occasion-specific,
not portable from vote to vote, not to be predicated of anyone across
particular  events of voting.  Only after the votes are tallied can you
say who, on that occasion, belongs to the majority and who does not.
In the procedural or constructivist conception, what defines you as a
member of the majority is nothing but the procedurally constructed
fact that the number who voted as you did,  on the occasion in ques-
tion, exceeds the number who voted divided by two.
In a substantive (essentialist) conception of rule by the majority,
that is not how it works.  In a substantive  conception, what defines
you as  a member of the majority, if you are one,  isn't how you did
vote, it's how you would vote.  It is the characteristic content of cer-
tain opinions  you hold or outlooks you have regarding some  gamut
of political choices that come before the country for decision.  You
are a member of the majority if and insofar as the general run of your
political  opinions and sensibilities coincides with what  is perceived
as the "majority"  opinion or sensibility.
In  a substantive  conception,  the majority  is  not  an  occasion-
specific,  procedurally  constructed,  numerical aggregate  of individu-
als who happen to have voted alike on some particular question.  It is
rather  a distinct  and characteristic  body of opinion  and  sensibility
quite  capable of maintaining  and projecting itself over time and is-
sue-space.  We're talking here about what political pundits vaguely
mean when they speak of the political wishes of "the people," or how
about "the Silent Majority"?  Isn't that a name some smarty gave to a
supposed  fraction of the populace  defined by political opinion, out-
look, leaning, disposition,  or sensibility?  Doubtless it's envisioned
as being the most numerous fraction of our populace, but still it's en-
visioned  as  having  a  shared  and  characteristic  leaning,  evident  or
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easily discoverable, regarding the contents of some-not necessarily
all-of  the  politically  decidable  questions  that  come  before  the
country.
No doubt such a conception involves  some measure  of counter-
factuality.  No doubt we idealize matters, or perhaps  one should say
we imagine things, if we envision  The Majority, or "the  people,"  as
the collective holder of a characteristic and distinctive set of political
wishes,  dispositions,  and  outlooks.  But-needless  to  say-the fact
that imagination may be involved in a certain take on the idea of rule
by the majority doesn't prevent this take from being actually present
in anyone's mind.
What seems to animate this way of thinking and talking, when it
isn't naked, partisan  spin-doctoring,  is a  genuine  sense that the ma-
jority,  substantively  conceived,  has  the  presumptive  moral  right  to
have  its characteristic  preference  prevail  in  any political  disagree-
ment  to  which it extends.11  We may  assume that this sense  of the
substantive majority's moral right to rule attaches  only because  and
insofar  as  the  substantive  majority  is  envisioned  as  a  numerically
preponderant  fraction of the populace.  The point remains  that  it is
envisioned  also as a spiritually unified fraction, entitled-if only by
numerical  preponderance-to  have its esprit translated  into  /'esprit
des lois.  A related attribute of what I'm calling a simple substantive
conception-to  be distinguished, in this respect, from the hybrid type
I'll come to later-is  that it envisions or insinuates  a division of the
country's  population  into  those  who  are,  and  those  who  are  not,
members of the substantive majority.
For purposes of our business at this Symposium, it is more than
a little interesting to notice  that Election Day voting-officially  tal-
lied popular  voting as  the process, or  a step  in the process,  of offi-
cially deciding political issues-is, in principle, quite collateral to the
simple substantive  conception  of rule by the majority.  In principle,
the  aim implied by that conception  is  to stay  abreast of substantive
majority opinion  and keep  official decision making tethered to  it, by
whatever may be the most effective means.  In practice, the most ef-
fective  means to  those  ends may or may not  include  Election  Day
voting.  Almost  certainly, they do not  include  our current  standard
11.  See, e.g., PARKER, supra note 7, at 96-97.
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form of Election Day voting, by artificially delimited, territorial con-
stituencies, typically each electing  a single Democrat  or Republican
to a representative  assembly. 12  Read Dick  Morris's  essay  and  see
how he thinks those ends might better be served by wide-open, unof-
ficial,  legally toothless  Internet  referenda,  self-starting  or privately
sponsored.  I am not saying Dick Morris believes, much  less main-
tains, that there is any such thing to be revealed  or expressed  as the
spirit  or  preference  of the  substantive  majority.  I  am  saying  he
shows us how Election Day voting is not, in the age of Internet,  its
necessary  or consummate  mode  of expression,  assuming  we con-
ceive it to  exist.  If Morris  has this right, then here is  one place at
which we see-for better or for worse-a possible significant contri-
bution of the Internet to American politics that would lie not in Elec-
tion Day voting but in other forms of popular political mobilization,
communication,  and expression-in "public  opinion  formation,"  as
Jiirgen Habermas might say, as opposed to "public will formation."'14
2.  Hybrid substantive majoritarianism
Consider Bruce Ackerman's normative conception of American
popular  sovereignty.  In Ackerman's  view,  it  is  the  People  of the
United States who rightfully govern here.  It is We who  are entitled
to have Our political will prevail, to the full extent of the content  of
that will.15  This seems different from a claim that "the majority's"
opinion ought to rule, in the following respect:  whereas "the major-
ity"  (substantively  speaking)  connotes  a body of opinion  to  which
not  everyone belongs-opposite  to  every majority  stands  a minor-
ity--"the People"  connotes an all-inclusive citizenry constituted by a
shared political opinion.
But of course this unity of views across  an entire populace  can-
not be envisioned as real in the same way as one easily, albeit possi-
bly falsely,  envisions the observable,  the evident reality of substan-
tive majority opinion.  Consider, for example, the issue of amending
the Constitution to allow  criminal  punishment  of flag-burners.  On
12.  See, e.g., Moglen &  Karlan, supra note 4, at 1093-95.
13.  See Morris, supra  note 1.
14.  See HABERMAS,  supra  note 8, at 170-71.
15.  See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,  WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS  13-16
(1991).
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this point, Ackerman himself could not be more clear.  Ackerman's
People, after all, are never corporately or instantaneously observable.
They  are counterfactual,  an idea of reason.  But the  idea of them,
Ackerman maintains, is capable  of being  approximately represented
by time-extended  courses  of political  events. 16  Sometimes,  Acker-
man says,  a course of events  can disclose  the existence  of a "mobi-
lized majority"  in favor of some notable  shift in the country's  offi-
cially recognized political orientation and practice-a majority of the
populace,  but  counted  by  giving  special  weight  to  the  fraction  of
them that in its address to the pending question is focused, persistent,
informed,  deliberate,  public-spirited,  and,  finally, deeply persuaded.
An  Ackermanian  "mobilized"  majority  is  a  clear  and  strong,  sus-
tained  and  committed  numerical  majority  that  arises,  consolidates,
and  persists  over  a time during  which  the  matters  in question  are
publicly controverted at a high level of energy, earnestness,  and con-
cern.
In  holding  that  a  political  opinion  is  entitled  to  prevail  once
proven  to  be  the opinion  of a  sufficiently mobilized  and  sustained
majority, Ackerman  offers  a  theory  of legitimate rule  in  America,
and one that we can locate on our shelf of normative theories of rule
by the majority.  So regarding it, we can see in it a "hybrid" of sub-
stantive and procedural conceptions.  On the level of imagination,  its
entitled  collective  ruler-the  People-are  constituted  by  the  sub-
stance, the content, of their shared political opinion.  On the level of
practice, however,  this  entity and  its  opinion  are  always  and  only
procedurally represented, never directly intuited or observed.
To illustrate:  Ackerman has put on the table a concrete proposal
for an improved  institutional  arrangement for  constitutional  amend-
ment.  It calls  for a concatenation  of approvals  from the President,
from  supermajorities  of both houses  of Congress,  and  from super-
majorities  of voters  on two  Election Days  separated  by a  quadren-
nium, voting on official propositions. 17  Alternatively, when we look
at Ackerman's  schemata for non-formal constitutional  amendment-
for example,  at his analyses of the historical  episodes  for which he
16.  In regard to this statement and the balance of the paragraph, see Frank I.
Michelman,  Thirteen Easy Pieces, 93  MICH.  L. REv.  1297,  1312-14  (1995),
and sources cited therein.
17.  See ACKERMAN, supra  note  15, at 54-55.
[34:985WHY  VOTING?
has claimed the force of amendment-we see that they, too, have in-
volved repeated Election Day votes.  While the votes are on candida-
cies only, not on propositions, Ackerman  allows them  to  count for
purposes  of constructing the  People  only when circumstances  are,
exceptionally,  such  that  candidacies  in  the  two-party  system  are
tightly correlated to major public-policy choices.18
True, Ackerman's amendment schemata,  formal or non-formal,
never depend on any Election Day vote standing alone.  They are  al-
ways  serial  compounds of multiple  Election  Day votes  with other
events  involving  all  three  branches  in  our  separated-and
-divided-powers  system of government. 19  Still, Ackerman  evidently
has  had  in  mind  that  the  official  and  formal  character  of  law-
governed, periodic  and time-certain,  countrywide balloting, on some
kind of officially stated proposition or candidacy, is an essential part
of what gives voting its crucial place  and role in a legitimate proce-
dural construction of the People's political opinion or will.
Suppose the Internet were to become, to the  fullest imaginable
extent,  the  potent, pliable,  transparent,  and  responsive  medium  for
political opinion formation and expression described by Dick Morris.
Would  Ackerman  then be  tempted  to reconsider  whether  Election
Day votes  are an indispensable  component of legitimate lawmaking
by the People?  I doubt it, for reasons that I'll try to  convey in Part
ll.B.2.
B.  Procedural  (Constructivist)  Conceptions of  Rule
By the Majority
1.  Perfect/imperfect procedural justice
Start with "perfect procedural justice."  Two or more disagree-
ing parties face a necessity to decide, in terms that will bind them all,
some practical question in which they all have legitimate stakes.  A
method  for decision  satisfies perfect procedural  justice when  the
following two conditions hold:  "First, there is an independent  crite-
rion  for  what  is  a  [just  or  correct  outcome],  a  criterion  defined
18.  See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,  WVE  THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS  pas-
sim (1998).
19.  See,  e.g.,  Bruce  Ackerman,  Higher Lawmaking, in  RESPONDING  TO
IMPERFECTION 63, 78-84 (Sanford Levinson ed.,  1995).
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separately  from and prior to the procedure which  is to be followed.
And, second,  [the procedure in question]  is sure to  give the desired
outcome.  The standard  example is the division of a cake  among
two or more persons who are all presumed  to want as much  as they
can get.  The independent criterion  of justice is equal shares.  In or-
der to achieve  it,  you make  one  of the parties  cut  the cake  into  as
many portions as there are parties, and you make that person take the
piece that is left after everyone  else has picked.  Assuming satisfac-
tion of certain  ideal  conditions  such as, for  example,  adequate  I.Q.
and surgical  skill on the part of the cutter, the cutter will divide  the
cake  equally.  As Rawls  says,  cases  like  this  are  rare  and of little
practical interest.
21
Much  less  rare  are  cases  of imperfect procedural  justice-in
which, again, there is an independent  criterion for the just or correct
outcome, but the procedure employed,  although recognizably chosen
in virtue of its perceived tendency toward the correct outcome, is by
no means guaranteed to produce it.  Rawls offers, as an example, the
procedure of deciding accusations of crime by adversary trials.22
It is easy to find in American political thought a variety of ways
in which political  decision  making by procedurally  constructed,  oc-
casion-specific,  simple majorities  figures  as a  practice  of imperfect
procedural justice.  The following brief survey may not be complete,
but it should suffice to convey the idea.
a.  utilitarian  theories
Suppose  your theory  of justice  aims  at political  outcomes  that
maximize, over time, the net sum of satisfactions  of desire across the
population.  It may be  that,  given  fulfillment  of certain  empirical
conditions,  a deftly devised set of arrangements for periodic, simple-
majoritarian,  Election Day and  legislative votes can be shown  to be
roughly conducive to the utilitarian  goal.  By this I mean conditions
and arrangements  such as unimodal preference  functions and a well-
discriminated  two-party  system.  What-if any-are  the  sufficient
conditions,  and  what-if any-are the  relevantly  deft  voting  ar-
rangements,  are  matters  studied  by  some  theorists  of  collective
20.  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74 (rev. ed. 1999).
21.  See id.
22.  See id. at 74-75.
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choice.23  Whether  these conditions  and  arrangements  exist  or are
specifiable,  and whether  the  Internet has  anything  to  contribute  to
their fulfillment or achievement, I do not attempt to say.
b.  egalitarian  theories
Maybe you think justice in political outcomes consists in every-
one's enjoying,  over time, the same ex ante or ex post measure of a
positive match between actual and preferred political  outcomes.  Of
course,  that's  a very hazy notion,  which  cannot be operationalized
without a great  deal of further,  no  doubt  contestable  specification.
Whether  the  practice  of periodic,  majoritarian,  Election  Day  and
legislative votes has any worthwhile  tendency to achieve it as speci-
fied,  or could  be  modified  so  that  it would,  is  at  best  unclear.24
Whether  or how  the Internet might  help or hinder this project is  a
question I must leave to others.  Professors Karlan and Moglen think
it might help, in a way that I will come to.25
c.  epistemic theories
There is at least one more way in which one might value instru-
mentally, for the sake of the outcomes to which it is believed to tend,
a constitutional  practice of allowing political issues to be decided by
simple-majority voting.  Whether one should class this last way as an
instance  of perfect/imperfect  procedural  justice  is not clear  to me.
To my ear, that term has a mechanical  ring.  It smacks  of constitu-
tional contrivance to wring just outcomes out of men who  are not an-
gels-out of political actors none of whom intentionally pursue just
outcomes.  The utilitarian and egalitarian theories I've just reviewed
both fit that mechanistic mold.  Far from assuming that any voter is
23.  For a sophisticated  review and analysis, see Brian Barry, Is Democracy
Special?, in PHILOSOPHY, POLrrIcs AND  SocIETY,  FIFTH SERIES  155,  161-68,
176-84 (Peter Laslett & James Fishkin eds.,  1979).
24.  We know by now  that one-off, "winner take all," simple-majority votes
don't measure  up to  any plausible  specification  of equal  outcomes  or  equal
chances.  The only hope for this project lies in a translation of simple-majority
voting into "minorities rule,"  by focusing  attention  on a time-extended,  con-
stitutional  practice  of holding  such  votes  periodically,  within  a  population
lacking a stable majority faction,  in which no interest  group is systematically
excluded from coalition-building.  See, e.g., Moglen & Karlan, supra  note 4.
25.  See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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aiming  at political outcomes  that maximize  social utility or equalize
political payouts,  those  theories  assume that  no voter  is,  and try  to
suggest how the voting practice might nevertheless  be, or be made,
conducive to one or another of those sorts of outcomes.
What I'm calling epistemic theories are in this respect quite dif-
ferent.  Such theories assume that each voter casts her vote as an ex-
pression of a  judgment, not a preference-a  judgment, for example,
about which of the political  options  on the table will be the utility-
maximizing  one.  Condorcet  showed  that if each voter has  a  better
than 0.5 probability of being right, then we maximize the chances  of
getting the  right  answer  by  following  the judgment  of the  simple
majority.26  But the requisite  assumptions will strike many as pretty
heroic.  The heavy preponderance of voters have to be envisioned  as
all of the following:  adequately informed,  adequately  intellectually
competent,  and  sincerely  expressing  honest personal judgments  all
aimed  at  the  same  conception  of a  correct  outcome,  and  all  unaf-
fected by systemic  and  strategic  considerations  such  as agenda ma-
nipulations and explicit or implicit vote trades.27
Thus  baldly  and  nakedly  presented,  epistemic  theories  look
hopeless-even more so  than the preceding,  ostensibly more realis-
tic, accounts of how majority-voting  conceivably  could help get you
to utilitarian or egalitarian  outcomes.  In Part III, below, I'll suggest
that epistemic  approaches  may possibly look more promising-and
more harmonious with vernacular American  democratic  ideology-
when  combined  with some intuitions  about majority  voting as  pure
procedural justice.
26.  See  David  Estlund,  Beyond  Fairness  and  Deliberation,  in
DELIBERATIVE  DEMOCRACY:  ESSAYS  IN REASON  AND  POLITICS  171,  185-89
(J. Bohman & W. Rehg eds.,  1997).
27.  If some participants  give their judgments about what course  will maxi-
mize social  utility while  others  give  their judgments  about  what  course  will
equalize payouts,  and still others give their judgments about what  course  will
respect the rights of individuals,  then the Condorcet  theorem won't work, no
matter how high the probability that every participant will judge correctly what
he or she  is trying to judge.  For full discussions of the Condorcet "jury theo-
rem,"  see  DUNCAN  BLACK,  THE  THEORY  OF  COMMITrEES  AND  ELECTIONS
156-84 (1958);  H.P. Young, Condorcet's Theory of Voting, 82  AM.  POL.  SCI.
REV.  1231  (1988).
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2.  Pure procedural justice
I have just passed in brief and crude review a variety of ways in
which one might value instrumentally,  for the sake of the outcomes
to which it is believed to tend, a constitutional practice of providing
for plenty of political decision making by procedurally  constructed,
occasional, popular and legislative  majorities.  These ways tend dis-
tinctly away from the vernacular and toward the academic.  They all
seem strained, artificial, to the point where one cannot help doubting
how much of a role they really play in American  attachment to gov-
emance by Election Day and legislative majority-voting.  On reflec-
tion, I find it hard not to think that the larger role belongs to inchoate
ideas about pure procedural justice.
Pure procedural justice-as distinguished from perfect/imperfect
procedural justice--obtains when
[T]here is no independent  criterion  for the right result:  in-
stead there is  a correct or fair procedure such that the out-
come is likewise correct or fair, whatever it is, provided that
the procedure has been properly followed....  If a number
of persons engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of
cash after the last bet is fair, or at least not unfair, whatever
this distribution is.28
Now, one can devise cases in which voting stands in place of the
flips of the  coin, cuts of the  deck,  and rolls of the  dice that Rawls
evokes.  Survivor, with its weekly series of votes determining the ul-
timate  million-dollar  winner,  comes  to  mind.  But  that's  because
Survivor is a game.  And the point about games, which brings them
to mind when we're trying to illustrate pure procedural justice, is that
they are activities in which people join voluntarily, just for the sake
of submitting  themselves-their  luck, skill,  or mettle-to  the  par-
ticular sort of test that is defined by the rules of the game they join.
If you ask why playing by the rules is the sole criterion of justice in
the  determination of winners  and losers  of games,  the  obvious and
sufficient  answer lies in the fact that the players choose to play the
game constituted by those very rules, presumably because that is the
game they wish to play.
28.  RAWLS, supra  note 20, at 75.
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We needn't belabor the point that no parallel explanation  holds
for the sometimes so-called game of politics.  Some people do play it
for sport,  of course,  but the  overwhelming  preponderance  of those
caught  up  in it  are  caught  willy-nilly,  for  what may be  very high
stakes.  And it is not immediately clear that, or how, the rule of deci-
sion by majority-rule  can  turn politics into  an  event  of pure proce-
dural justice for its non voluntary participants  and victims.  It is not
immediately  clear  how  a political  outcome,  with the  coercive  edge
that political outcomes always  have,  can be counted  right, fair, just,
or correct just because a majority voted it.
But  now  I  think  we  must  take  care  not  to  let  ourselves  be
trapped  by the verbal  distinction  of "pure"  procedural  justice  from
the perfect/imperfect  kind.  That distinction can trick us into search-
ing in a set of rules for some strictly procedural attribute of fairness,
some attribute we think a set of rules can possess just as such, just as
a purely procedural  thing of beauty  and joy forever,  divorced  from
every last taint  of pollution by human purpose  or substantive  aim.
Whether  any  such  thing  is  conceivable  I  don't  know,  but  John
Rawls's notion of pure procedural justice does not imply it.
Let us ask:  What causes (so to speak), or grounds, the justice of
letting the outcome of a crapshoot be decided by a true application  of
the rules of craps?  It isn't, surely, the crystalline beauty or egalitar-
ian perfection  of those  rules  or of the  game  they constitute.  It  is,
surely,  the desire  and free  agreement  of the players  of the  game to
play that game.29  And agreement-consent-as  a ground of justice
surely  is  not  a purely  procedural  notion.  It  is  rather  an  intuition
closely tied  to  some  notion we  have of human purposes  or  human
flourishing-of human freedom, dignity, autonomy, responsibility.
30
29.  There is no equality inside the rules of craps.  If, as a result of my first
roll, my "point"  is twelve,  it's not  even-steven whether  twelve  (1:36  on each
roll) or seven or "snake  eyes" (6:36 + 1:36 = 7:36 on each  roll) will be first to
turn up  in the  ensuing series of rolls.  The  equality in the  game is  external  to
the  rules.  It  lies  only  in  the  equal  opportunity  each  player  has  to  decide
whether or not to play-that is, to decide what bet to place, if any, on each up-
coming roll or series of rolls.  Equality in this game is non-severable  from-it
is constituted by-free consent.
30.  Someone loses the ranch on a roll of the dice he agreed to, but only in
order to ransom his kidnaped  child.  Try to specify the  sense of injustice  ac-
cording to which we would say:  That is unjust if the dice were loaded, but not
if they were true.  Or in which  we would say:  If the  dice were  loaded, then
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So the question is:  What, if anything, can take the place of free
agreement  as the ground of our intuition of the pure procedural jus-
tice-the outcome-disregarding justice-of letting a set of outcomes
be decided by the true application of a given set of rules?  And the
answer,  for better  or for worse,  that  I think  inheres  in the  strong
American  attachment to  the constitutional  practice  of majoritarian,
Election Day and legislative  voting is  a  compound of rough  intui-
tions of necessity with rough intuitions of human dignity and auton-
omy.
Political disagreements arise, and sometimes they have to be re-
solved-formally, officially-so  that the country and its people  can
get on with their lives.  Some form of intentional human decision is
inevitable.  Hobbes's contention that it's far, far better to provide for
this constitutionally than just leave it to  nature is, among us, unan-
swerable.  Now, to put the matter crudely, but maybe not too crudely
for  present  purposes,  the  basic  constitutional  option  lies  between
committing the power of decision to a hereditary rulership  and com-
mitting it to periodic votes and  elections.  Democratic  ideology not
only rules out the first option, it narrows  the second  option to peri-
odic popular  votes  and elections.  In our civilization,  people have a
burning  need, and  they make  a morally cognizable  demand,  to be
treated, individually and formally, as equals in the business  of gov-
erning  the country,  and simple  majority  voting  does that in a way
that is maximally transparent, for our culture, now.31  When, toward
the end of a strenuous  faculty  meeting,  with consensus  nowhere  in
sight, someone  sings out "let's vote,"  he is making  an  Americanly
irrefutable plea for pure procedural justice.
Please don't misunderstand me.  I would be the last to deny that
simple-majority  voting  is,  in  the  current  conditions  of American
politics, very often open to very serious objection on grounds of inef-
ficiency, inequality of both chances  and outcomes,  and insensitivity
to human rights.32  I am  strongly inclined to believe that alternative
there were two injustices, but if  they were true there was only one.
31.  See  Jeremy  Waldron,  The  Majority Principle, in  THE- DIGNITY  OF
LEGISLATION  148  & n.38  (1999)  (citing sources  of technical  demonstration
that decision by majority rule gives "each individual's view the greatest weight
possible ...  compatible with an equal weight for the view of each of the oth-
ers").
32.  See, e.g., Moglen & Karlan, supra  note 4, at 1093-1100.
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voting  arrangements, of the kind that interest Professors  Karlan and
Moglen, would do much better along  all those  fronts.33  But the ar-
guments to that effect appear to lack full transparency in our consti-
tutional culture, and it's arguable that full transparency here is itself a
dimension of justice.  As I  said, in our  civilization,  people  make  a
morally cognizable  demand  to be treated, individually  and formally,
as equals in the business of governing the country.
It is not beside the point to notice how the instrumentalist theo-
ries, the ones I classed as "imperfect procedural justice,"  may return
here  in a kind of secondary role.  Suppose Americans  by and large
saw decision by simple majority voting as fraught with dreadful  con-
sequences for government in the general interest of the people  or for
a decent  distribution of political  chances  and payoffs.  Then I think
we may be sure that "let's vote" would not have for Americans  the
ring of pure procedural justice.  The fact, though, is that we don't and
it does.  As long as procedural majorities of the electorate-no  mat-
ter how baroquely mediated by districting, electoral  colleges,  etc.-
can turn rascals out of office, Americans  of our times will perceive
some  tendency of simple-majoritarian  politics  to constrain  govern-
ment  toward  aggregate  social  welfare.34   As  long  as  coalition-
building  remains  broadly  necessary to  political  success,  we'll  per-
ceive some tendency of simple-majoritarian politics  to achieve  a de-
cent distribution of power and payoff-which is not to say we won't,
in so perceiving, be partially blinded by prejudice.
Obviously, those are far from perfect resolutions on the fronts of
social utility and  equality.  Some  of us  in this Symposium  believe
strongly  that better  ones  are  available,  and  maybe  we  have  quite
good, scientific arguments to that effect.  But what we have not had,
and what we would need in order to strip simple majority voting of
its luster of pure procedural justice, is this:  alternatives to  offer that
willfeel as natural, as indubitably expressive of every citizen's equal
political standing, as non-devious and just plain fair on a gut level, as
simple majority voting now does feel to most Americans.
Where  does  all  this leave  us  on  the question  of the  Internet's
possible  contribution  to  the  improvement  or  the  impairment  of
33.  See id. at 1100-01.
34.  See  JOSEPH  A.  SCHUMPETER,  CAPITALISM,  SOCIALISM  AND
DEMOCRACY 269-83  (3d ed. 1950).
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American politics?  One might think, nowhere very interesting.  The
question  as I've posed it is this:  Why simple-majoritarian  Election
Day voting?  If the answer were as I have just been suggesting-the
practice  satisfies  a morally  respectable  impulse  for pure procedural
justice in politics, and does so in a way that has at least gross appar-
ent tendencies in the directions of efficiency and equality-then nice
calculations  of the  effect  of Internet  voting  on  sectoral  voting-
participation  rates  would  seem  beside  the  point,  unless  and  until
someone can show that such effects  were designed and  intended for
reasons  of prejudice  or partisan  strategic  advantage.  The  Supreme
Court's  embattled  "because  of'"in spite  of' distinction"  will  feel
just right for the occasion.
But  note, please,  that I've tried  hard  to  avoid  suggesting  that
simple-majoritarian Election Day voting is connected in some tran-
scendent way to the impulse for pure procedural justice in politics.  I
think that connection exists in America now, but I view  it as a his-
torically contingent matter, and one of our papers-that of Professors
Karlan  and  Moglen-speculates  that  it  may  not  exist  for  much
longer, because the Internet experience may dislodge  it.36  I'll leave
it to them to elaborate, saying here only that if it really does come to
pass that the Internet  experience breaks up the American  impulse to
make simple majority voting the palladium of pure procedural justice
in politics, the consequences could be epic.
III.  CODA:  DISCURSIVE DEMOCRACY
But  suppose  Professors  Karlan  and  Moglen  are  wrong,  and
American constitutional-democratic  practice  is destined to retain its
profound attachment to simple majoritarian, Election Day and legis-
lative voting.  I'm guessing that many people-I think again of Dick
Morris's  paper-share  a hope that the Internet will have something
substantial and beneficial to contribute to that practice, and I'd like to
end by trying to  cast that hope in what I would  regard  as its best
light.
35.  See, e.g.,  Pers. Adm'r v.  Feeney, 442  U.S.  256,  258,  278-80  (1979)
("'[D]iscriminatory  purpose'  requires  that the decisionmaker  selected  a par-
ticular course of action at least in part 'because  of,' not merely 'in spite of,'  its
adverse effects upon an identifiable group.").
36.  See Moglen & Karlan, supra note 4.
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Democracy,  a proudly democratic  citizenry might think,  is not
for every country at every historical moment.  Rather, it is an ideal fit
only  for  a  citizenry  prepared  to  rise  to  its  challenge,  a  citizenry
mainly composed of politically reasonable persons.  Politically rea-
sonable  persons  have  two  traits.  First, they  accept  the  primordial
freedom and equality of each person, along with the ineluctable cor-
ollary of political reciprocity, which means that one doesn't claim or
seek, in the arrangements  for deployment of coercion that politics in-
evitably involves,  any kind or degree of special privilege  for  one's
own vision or one's own interest.  Second, politically reasonable per-
sons, taking for granted that every significant political  outcome will
probably be bitterly unwelcome to some party, including sometimes
one's own, nevertheless  believe,  on essentially  Hobbesian  grounds,
that some  worlds in which the practice of coercive political  govern-
ment prevails are better for everyone than any world in which it does
not.
Democracy,  then,  becomes  an  ideal  of a  political  practice  in
which  coercive  political  outcomes  are justifiable,  or  maybe  one
should say they  are tolerable to everyone-and  I mean  to  everyone,
not just to a substantive majority or even the Ackermanian mobilized
majority that stands in for the People-because the practice is as well
contrived as a political practice can be to produce  outcomes that are
acceptable to  every politically reasonable  person.37 Democracy  be-
comes  an  ideal  in which  substantive  and  pure-procedural  elements
and themes are inextricably mixed,  even  fused.  On the  substantive
side,  at least  some political  outcomes-the  constitutional ones,  the
ones that fix the arrangements by which all further political outcomes
are decided-have to pass directly the substantive  test of acceptabil-
ity to every politically reasonable person.38  On the pure-procedural
side,  it  could  be  that  they  will  fail  that  test  unless  they  make
37.  In other  words, democracy is  the  ideal  according  to which,  if you  up-
hold and support the practice, you do so believing  that it meets the stated test.
Democracy, on  this view, is  inseparable from  an ideal of public reason.  See
generally JOHN  RAWLS,  The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, in COLLECTED
PAPERS 573 (Samuel Freeman ed.,  1999).
38.  The idea is that sub constitutional political outcomes can inherit accept-
ability from the universal  substantive acceptability  of the procedures  that pro-
duced them.  See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity and "Constitlu-
tionalPatriotism",  76 DENy. U. L. REv.  1009,  1015 (1999).
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provision  for  periodic  Election  Day  voting,  and  the  reason  why
might lie beyond any hoped-for mechanical virtue of producing effi-
cient  outcomes  or equal  distributions of satisfactions.  It might  be
traceable to an intuition as procedural  as it is substantive and as sub-
stantive  as  it is  procedural,  that  is,  the  intuition of the  equal  self-
governing dignity of every affected person.39
Now, there  is  nothing  in this  argument  that says  the  Election
Day voting has to  be  simple majority voting,  "first  past  the post"
voting.  But neither is there anything in it that says it can 't be that, or
that the transparency advantages of simple majority voting-as long
as it retains them, which  Professors Karlan  and Moglen  think  may
not be for too much longer4  -- have to be sacrificed  to  some other
more pressing  moral  consideration  of efficiency  or  equality.  That
latter inference  is easily avoided.  You can  avoid  it by refusing to
think of Election Day or legislative  votes  as concluding  any issues
for all time, or as announcing resolutions  that anyone should  accept
as correct  on the merits just because  the most recent Election  Day
and legislative majorities voted for them.  You might rather think of
the pursuit of correct decisions as longer-term work, work that pro-
ceeds by interchange  among persons  and groups of diverse history,
situation, and vision.  You might think of Election Day and legisla-
tive votes as way stations in that process, designed to provide us with
the institutional  settlements  we need,  when political  disagreements
simply have to be resolved for official purposes  and for the time be-
ing.  But you think of the real, the deeper work of democracy as be-
ing the ongoing work of political communication,  debate,  and opin-
ion-formation,  lying  mainly  outside  of  Election  Days  although
surrounding them and expected to influence them.4'
I say, you might  expect  the process  of political  exchange  and
debate to influence  Election Days,  and yet it might not necessarily
follow that you try to build that influence mechanically into Election
Days,  for  example  through  plural  or  transferable  voting  schemes.
You might refrain because, frankly, you can't right now explain your
reasons with enough force to make whatever result we'd end up with
39.  See id. at 1017,  1021.
40.  See Moglen & Karlan, supra  note 4, at 1100-01.
41.  Cf FRANK I.  MICHELMAN,  BRENNAN  AND  DEMOCRACY  58-62 (1999)
(applying a related analysis to the debate over judicial review).
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sufficiently  transparently  formally  equal  to  satisfy  the  pure-
procedural-justice term in the full democratic  equation.
No doubt such a loose conception of discursive  democracy does
itself involve  a very  strong  idealization-that  is,  of the  ultimately
justice-serving, or reciprocity-serving,  motivations of participants  in
politics.  I began this discussion, after all, with an attribution to who-
ever thinks this way of a belief that democracy is a fit ideal only for a
population of politically reasonable persons.  But that does not mean
that no one who is not himself or herself a really-truly politically rea-
sonable person can fancy the ideal.  Americans  at large could  fancy
it, as an ideology.  I don't know that we do, but I'm not sure that we
don't.  It seems to me a question one wouldn't want architects  of our
future politics ignoring.